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THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
IN HARD AND SOFT COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS ON
SOCIAL MEDIA
By Jonathan Schnader1
The United States government excels at hard measures to
counterterrorism, like military operations, non-kinetic information
operations, and criminal prosecutions. However, in terms of
counterterrorism, the First Amendment obstructs the United States
government’s efforts to prevent and contain the recruitment efforts of
terrorist organizations like ISIS, which have professional-grade social
media marketing wings. But, counterterrorism efforts do not need to
rest solely within the government. Social media platforms, which can
be used in softer counterterrorism approaches, must step up to the plate
to combat terrorist recruitment on their platforms. Indeed, some social
media platforms have made great strides in deactivating terrorist
accounts, but they must continue to evolve to combat and minimize
radicalization. This Article proposes that artificial intelligence can aid
both the government and the private sector to combat terrorists and
terrorist recruitment. Ultimately, the Article proposes that the
government use AI to further its hard counterterrorism efforts, and
social media platforms should employ AI to augment their soft
counterterrorism approaches.

1
Jonathan A. Schnader lives in Washington, D.C. He earned his bachelor’s degree in
Psychology and Classical Humanities from Miami University of Ohio. He earned his J.D. cum
laude from Syracuse University College of Law with a Certificate of Advanced Study in
National Security and Counterterrorism Law. Following law school, he worked as an Assistant
Public Defender in Rochester, NY for five and a half years handling just under four-thousand
criminal cases. In addition to being licensed to practice law in New York and Washington D.C.,
he became a Certified Anti-Money Laundering Specialist. Jonathan recently graduated with
distinction from Georgetown University Law Center, where he completed a Master of Laws in
National Security Law. His academics and current practice focus on national security
dimensions of several areas, including cybersecurity; artificial intelligence; blockchain and
cryptocurrency; intelligence and counterintelligence; and social media.
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INTRODUCTION
Over the past ten years, social media platforms like Facebook,
YouTube, and Twitter2 quickly integrated themselves into the daily
lives of people across the globe, becoming a central part of everyday
life from keeping up with friends, to getting news and current events.3
The centrality of social media in daily life – specifically for Americans
– is apparent through daily use statistics: “Fully 74% of Facebook users
say they visit the site daily, with around half (51%) saying they do
several times a day.”4 Indeed, the accessibility of social media to
everyday, normal people has changed the scope of human interaction,
from how people gather information to how people communicate. In
terms of American values, the freedom to communicate freely, without
government intervention, is a foundational and bedrock principle
woven into the fabric of American society by way of the First
Amendment to the Constitution:
A fundamental principle of the First Amendment is that all
persons have access to places where they can speak and listen,
and then, after reflection, speak and listen once more. . . .
While in the past there may have been difficulty in identifying
the most important places (in a spatial sense) for the exchange
of views, today the answer is clear. It is cyberspace—the ‘vast
democratic forums of the Internet’ in general, and social
media in particular.”5
The guarantees of the First Amendment are so powerful, and the
use of social media in society is so ubiquitous, that in Packingham,
above, the Supreme Court struck down post-conviction prohibitions for
convicted sex offenders (perceived by many to be the most
contemptible types of criminals) from using social media because to do
so would be to:
bar[] access to what for many are the principal sources for
knowing current events, checking ads for employment,
speaking and listening in the modern public square, and
otherwise exploring the vast realms of human thought and
2
For the purposes of this Article, social media describes traditional social media like Facebook,
Twitter, etc., but also includes interactive search engines like Google, and even online retail
with interactive qualities, like Amazon.
3
See ELISA SHEARER & KATERINA EVA MATSA, NEWS USE ACROSS SOCIAL MEDIA
PLATFORMS 2018 (Pew Research Center, Sept. 10, 2018),
https://www.journalism.org/2018/09/10/news-use-across-social-media-platforms-2018/.
4
AARON SMITH & MONICA ANDERSON, SOCIAL MEDIA USE IN 2018 5 (Pew Research Center,
Mar. 1, 2018), https://www.pewinternet.org/2018/03/01/social-media-use-in-2018/.
5
Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S.Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017) (quoting Reno v. American Civil
Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 868 (1997).
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knowledge. These websites can provide perhaps the most
powerful mechanisms available to a private citizen to make
his or her voice heard.6
But, a side effect of freedom is that sometimes, it is not only used
for good, but also for ill. In the case of social media, terrorist networks,
specifically the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria [“ISIS”], have turned to
social media as their prime recruitment tool: it provides a platform for
them to broadcast their message to millions of people; it bestows a
degree of anonymity or pseudonymity; and most importantly for their
purposes, if they closely manage their speech, it insulates them from
investigation or prosecution by their strongest enemy, the American
government. “Social networking sites are known for their ability to
bring like-minded people together, and terrorist organizations utilize
these sites to recruit, fundraise, and spread terrorist propaganda. These
websites create a convenient and inexpensive platform for terrorist
organizations to expand their global reach, amass support from other
like-minded extremists, and capitalize on a larger network of diverse
talents and skills.”7
Platforms, like Facebook, project images of being virtual spaces
for pure First Amendment expression. However, some platforms have
moved beyond their desultory self-policing plans, into more
meaningful paradigms for self-regulation, claiming to have increased
their internal methods for parsing violent, extremist, or illegal content.
For example, Jack Dorsey, Chief Executive Officer [“CEO”] of
Twitter, eloquently stated why violent, malicious, and hateful content
on Twitter impairs the free flow of ideas: “Twitter is built and measured
by how we help encourage more healthy debate, conversation, and
critical thinking. Conversely, abuse, malicious automation, and
manipulation detracts from it.”8
With billions of users and over a billion hours of content
consumed by users each day,9 the ability of a platform to monitor all
potentially objectionable material is beyond human comprehension and
galactic in scope. Who or what is in a position to digest that quantum
of information? The answer, unsurprisingly, is artificial intelligence
[“AI”]. Similar to how social media changed the global geo-social6

Packingham, 137 S.Ct. at 1737.
Nicole Phe, Social Media Terror: Reevaluating Intermediary Liability Under the
Communications Decency Act, 51 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 99, 100-01 (2018).
8
Testimony of Jack Dorsey Chief Executive Officer, Twitter, Inc.: Hearing Before the S. Select
Comm. on Intelligence, 116th Cong. 1 (Sept. 5, 2018).
9
YouTube reports that its over one billion users watch one billion hours of content daily, which
equals approximately 114,115 years of content consumed per day. See e.g., YouTube for Press,
YOUTUBE, https://www.youtube.com/yt/about/press/ (last visited Aug. 17, 2019).
7
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political topography, so too will AI contribute to and/or cause a rapid
shift in how individuals, companies, and governments synthesize and
understand information and data, in local, regional, national, and global
contexts. The current presidential administration, acknowledging how
pivotal AI is, issued an executive order declaring that the government
will go “full steam ahead” to encourage and foster AI development
both in government and in the private sector.10
For purposes of this discussion, the definition of “AI” must be
established to keep a uniform vocabulary throughout this Article.
Therefore, “AI,” for the purposes of our discussion, means “systems
that can emulate, augment, or compete with the performance of
intelligent humans in well-defined tasks.”11 This broad definition
includes all types of AI systems, from simpler algorithms (narrow
and/or “dumb” AI systems) to Artificial General Intelligence, defined
as “‘strong’ [AI] with the full range of cognitive capacities typically
possessed by humans, including self-awareness.”12
How can AI systems help the U.S. counterterrorism effort?
Generally, scholarship since September 11, 2001 focuses on a spectrum
of counterterrorism strategies that range from “hard” strategies like
covert action, targeted killings, war, and prosecution, to “soft”
counterterrorism strategies focusing on radicalization prophylaxis,
deterrence, and rehabilitation. This analysis seeks to elucidate the
benefits of AI applied to this spectrum of counterterrorism strategies.
Road Map
First, this analysis will discuss counterterrorism terminology,
strategy, and scholarship. This analysis will then summarize various AI
fundamentals. Following the description of AI systems, this analysis
will survey methods for employing AI in strategic counterterrorism
efforts from the perspective of the U.S. government. After discussing
the use of AI by the government, it will analyze the use of AI systems
by the private sector, particularly social media platforms in combatting
terrorism. Finally, this Article will conclude with some general
guidance and proposals. In sum, AI is best suited for the U.S.
10

See Exec. Order No. 13859, 3 C.F.R. § 3967 (Feb. 11, 2019),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/executive-order-maintaining-americanleadership-artificial-intelligence/.
11
Shannon Vallor & George A. Bekey, Artificial Intelligence and the Ethics of Self-Learning
Robots, in ROBOT ETHICS 2.0: FROM AUTONOMOUS CARS TO ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 339
(Patrick Lin, Keith Abney, & Ryan Jenkins eds., 2017). This book contains some of the best and
most accessible descriptions, summaries, and explanations of AI systems, and I have cited to
their definitions in several other AI related articles.
12
Id. at 339-340.
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government for use in “hard” approaches to counterterrorism, and
excellent for use in “soft” approaches to counterterrorism employed by
social media platforms.
IV.

CONCEPTUAL GROUNDINGS IN COUNTERTERRORISM

The United States underwent an extreme transition in national
security strategy after the September 11th attacks, mobilizing for war
and shifting to an unrelenting hunt for terrorists. After what most
consider to be a successful campaign against Al Qaeda, a new terrorist
organization emerged on the global stage: ISIS. ISIS proclaimed that it
established a new world order and Islamic caliphate in the Middle East,
seizing territory in warn-torn Syria and Iraq, establishing a fledgling
government and recruiting people to its cause on social media. Its deft
use of social media as a recruitment tool resulted in thousands of people
from all over the globe traveling to fight on behalf of ISIS, as well as
radicalizing and committing acts of violence in their home countries in
the name of ISIS.13
The counterterrorism strategy spectrum ranges from “hard”
approaches which “are more militaristic in approach–involving
targeted assassinations or even warfare,” to “soft” counterterrorism
“programs [which] seek to undo the radicalization process by
engineering the individual’s return to moderate society, usually by
providing them with [a] stable support network, probing their original
reasons for radicalizing, and divorcing them from their extreme beliefs
and social contacts.”14 The scholarship evaluating potentially effective
counterterrorism strategies seems to endorse a holistic approach: a
State should employ hard measures – investigation, prosecution, and
incarceration – likewise the U.S. government should use soft measures
to deter and prevent radicalization before it starts, and reverse the
radicalization process as it progresses.
This section will contextualize terrorist recruitment on social
media in general. This analysis will then move to discuss
counterterrorism measures, briefly mentioning “hard” approaches, but
ultimately focusing on “soft” measures like counter-radicalization. As
discussion later in the analysis will demonstrate, both “hard” and “soft”

13
Importantly, the threat of “domestic terrorists,” deserves scholarship and analysis. This
analysis focuses mostly on terrorist recruitment by ISIS because vast scholarship and data exist
about ISIS’s methods. Many of the approaches and challenges discussed in this analysis overlap
with domestic terrorist threats.
14
ELLIE B. HEARNE & NUR LAIQ, A NEW APPROACH? DERADICALIZATION PROGRAMS AND
COUNTERTERRORISM 3 (International Peace Institute, June 2010), https://www.ipinst.org/wpcontent/uploads/publications/a_new_approach_epub.pdf [hereinafter IPI Report].
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approaches to counterterrorism stand to benefit from AI systems
tailored to their objectives.
A. Terrorist Recruitment
Recently, former Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Director,
James Comey, highlighted the burgeoning surge of terrorist use of
social media to recruit individuals for their cause: “During my time as
director we had an explosion of the use of social media to proselytize
by terrorist organizations, especially the so-called Islamic State, to
recruit and to direct terrorist activity through the internet. That was a
big change.”15 As the FBI Director at the time, James Comey bore
responsibility for adapting Federal law enforcement and
counterintelligence resources to combat the emerging threat of social
media in terms of terrorist recruitment:
The technology platforms are where we live, today. It’s
where, depressingly, increasingly our social lives – not mine
– but normal people’s social lives are. That, in a cool way and
in a disturbing way, it’s made everybody a next-door neighbor
to everybody else. And, so there is a lot great about that, but
there is a lot of danger in that because it brings crazy people
and dangerous people close to each other, and allows them to
use those platforms to recruit, to share information and plans,
to direct, to control.16
Social media serves as a worldwide “soapbox” and recruitment
platform: “social networking allows terrorists to reach out to their
target audiences and virtually ‘knock on their doors’–in contrast to
older models of websites in which terrorists had to wait for visitors to
come to them.”17
More specifically, ISIS:
. . . has employed social media to gain the attention of massmedia and strategic audiences, inflate and control its
messaging in support of its narrative in order to recruit and
radicalize followers, deter their opponents and to raise funds.
. . . At the same time, they manage to construct their ‘selfexpression’ in a way supportive of their narrative, while
displaying an understanding of how to disrupt an opponent’s
narrative and online activities by exploiting their messaging
15
Bonus Edition: James Comey at Verify 2019, LAWFARE PODCAST (Apr. 11, 2019),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/lawfare-podcast-bonus-edition-james-comey-verify-2019.
16
Id.
17
Gabriel Weimann, New Terrorism and New Media, WILSON CENTER COMMONS LAB
RESEARCH SERIES VOL. 2, 2014 at 3, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/new-terrorismand-new-media.
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in order to position themselves and their ‘brand’ amongst
other jihadist factions in the Middle East.18
Recent estimates suggest that ISIS recruited over 16,000 to join
their cause through the use of social media.19 Moreover, the ISIS threat
of violence does not consist of only people who physically join ISIS in
the Middle East, but also “homegrown violent extremists,” who are
radicalized through social media to commit acts of violence in their
home countries.20 Some officials believe that the threat of violence
from “homegrown violent extremists” is the “most likely and
immediate threat” to the United States.21 In his 2018 Global Threat
Assessment, Director of National Intelligence, Dan Coats, specifically
pointed to ISIS – as well as homegrown violent extremists – as
“continuing terrorist threats to US interests and partners worldwide.”22
In the most recent Global Threat Assessment, Coats noted the despite
major territorial losses suffered by ISIS, if counterterrorism pressure
exerted by the United States and its partners were to wane, ISIS could
rebuild “key capabilities,” including “external operations” and “media
production.”23
Terrorist organizations, often using Facebook or Twitter, seek out
“disenfranchised or disaffected people by tweeting, retweeting, and
using popular hashtags . . . relating to divisive current events”; “create
[an] online micro-community around the targeted recruit”; and
“encourage the recruit to isolate himself from moderating
influences.”24 As an individual becomes more radicalized, the
recruiters shift their communications to private social media platforms

18
Thomas Elkjer Nissen, #TheWeaponizationOfSocialMedia 58-59 (Royal Danish Defence
College, 2015) (citing Mark Borkowski, Isis and the Propaganda War: How the social-savvy
Extremist Are Dominating the Headlines, THE DRUM (June 25, 2014),
https://www.thedrum.com/opinion/2014/06/25/isis-and-propaganda-war-how-social-savvyextremists-are-dominating-headlines.
19
Susan Klein & Crystal Flinn, Social Media Compliance Programs and the War Against
Terrorism, 8 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 53, 65 (2017).
20
Id.
21
Id. (citing Current Terrorist Threat to the United States: Hearing Before the S. Select Comm.
on Intelligence, 114th Cong. (2015) (statement of Nicholas J. Rasmussen, Director, Nat’l
Counterterrorism Center)) (internal quotations omitted).
22
Dan Coats, Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence
Community, Director of Nat’l Intelligence, S. Select Comm. on Intelligence (Feb. 13, 2018) at 9.
23
Dan Coats, Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence
Community, Director of Nat’l Intelligence, S. Select Comm. on Intelligence (Jan. 29, 2019) at
11.
24
Klein & Flinn, supra note 19, at 66 (quoting J.M. Berger, Tailored Online Interventions: The
Islamic State’s Recruitment Strategy, COMBATING TERRORISM CTR. SENTINEL, Oct. 2015 at 21),
https://ctc.usma.edu/tailored-online-interventions-the-islamic-states-recruitment-strategy/
(internal quotations omitted).
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with encryption like WhatsApp, Kik, Telegram, etc., and this transition
from the public to private space is known as “going dark.”25
ISIS’ uniquely insidious, “comprehensively designed and
carefully branded operation”26 that uses professional level marketing
tactics, differs starkly from Al Qaeda’s notoriously low-budget, grainy
VHS recordings of clerics speaking into a camera. Indeed, “[ISIS] is as
much a media conglomerate as a fighting force.”27 A 2015 think tank
reported that ISIS releases “38 new items per day–20-minute videos,
full-length documentaries, photo essays, audio clips, and pamphlets, in
languages ranging from Russian to Bengali.”28 ISIS evidently
embraces a strategy of mass-appeal, using numerous narratives (utopia,
mercy, brutality, war, belonging, inter alia) to further its goals:
[ISIS’s] supporters are presented with a comprehensive idea
of what life in its ‘caliphate’ is like. Brutality plays an
important role in this image, but is by no means the key to
[ISIS’s] appeal, as is regularly argued. Mercy and belonging,
both narratives that featured heavily . . . are no longer as
prominent as they had been in the past, something that is
reflective of a shift in priorities for the group. Far more
conspicuous are its attempts to reinforce the victimhood
narrative by playing upon the ‘War on Islam’ . . . [ISIS’s]
propagandists expend a great amount of effort portraying it as
militarily dynamic and ever-expanding. After all, the
perception of momentum is central to its ‘winner’s
messaging.’ The most prominent narrative, by far, is that of
utopia. At once the most appealing promise of the group . . .
[ISIS’s] media strategists ensure that utopia is sold as a
comprehensive project, where the economy flourishes,
‘Islam’ is implemented, wildlife thrives, rule of law prevails
and the government governs.29
In sum, the daily ISIS propaganda blast coupled with recruiters on
social media function to radicalize numerous individuals.

25

Klein & Flinn, supra note 19, at 67.
CHARLIE WINTER, DOCUMENTING THE VIRTUAL CALIPHATE 39 (Quilliam Foundation, Oct.
2015) http://www.quilliaminternational.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/FINAL-documentingthe-virtual-caliphate.pdf [hereinafter Quillam Report].
27
Brendan I. Koerner, Why ISIS is Winning the Social Media War, WIRED (Apr. 2016),
https://www.wired.com/2016/03/isis-winning-social-media-war-heres-beat/.
28
Id. (citing the Quilliam Report, supra note 26, at 25).
29
Quilliam Report, supra note 26, at 38-39.
26
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B. Hard Approaches to Counterterrorism
The term “hard” refers to an approach to counterterrorism based
on “coercion (such as military force and economic sanctions) . . . .”30
As discussed above, “[c]ontributing significantly to [terrorist attacks
connected with or inspired by ISIS] is the risk that individuals will
become radicalized by viewing extremist material on the Internet.
While this threat was growing many years before [ISIS], [ISIS’s]
significant online presence makes this a particular challenge in the
current security environment.”31 Hard approaches – like military
intervention, covert action, economic sanctions, and criminal arrests
and prosecutions – play an important part to combatting
counterterrorism. Primarily, the responsibility to implement hard
counterterrorism measures lies with the government. The nexus
between hard counterterrorism efforts and social media exist in two
major buckets: (1) using social media as a source of intelligence for
military or covert operations abroad and (2) criminalizing behavior on
social media aimed at radicalization or recruitment.
The U.S. military uses “kinetic” and “non-kinetic” approaches to
bolster its hard approaches to counterterrorism: “kinetic” refers to “[a]
proactive and aggressive approach, kinetic action targets enemy
combatants and their supporters to neutralize, capture or eliminate
them.”32 Considered the most aggressive approach, it involves “the
removal of central nodes or brokers, or they involve the breaking of
key ties or links among individuals, groups, or organizations.”33 In
other words, by analyzing various terrorist groups or networks, military
officials can choose the most integral connections and disrupt them
through person-targeting or group-targeting.34 On the other hand, “nonkinetic” measures are milieu approaches in nature. “Non-kinetic”
measures involve “a more subtle and patient application of power by
seeking to undermine terror networks ‘more through cooperation and
collaboration with partners than through unilateral American action,
more with the diplomatic and economic tools of national power than

30

Keiran Hardy, Hard and Soft Power Approaches to Countering Online Extremism, GRIFFITH
CRIMINOLOGY INST., Jan. 2017, at 2,
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/326288572_Hard_and_soft_power_approaches_to_co
untering_online_extremism.
31
Id. at 1.
32
Nancy Roberts & Sean F. Everton, Strategies for Combating Dark Networks, 12 J. OF SOC.
STRUCTURE 1, 4 (Jan. 5, 2011),
https://www.cmu.edu/joss/content/articles/volume12/RobertsEverton.pdf.
33
Id.
34
See id.
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with the military, stressing inspiration rather than prescription.’”35
Non-kinetic strategies include institution building (civil assistance, and
humanitarian aid); psychological operations (“dissemination of
information for the purpose of influencing the emotions, perceptions,
attitudes, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign
nationals”); and information operations (“electronic warfare and
computer network operations”).36 Military approaches (both kinetic
and non-kinetic) cost the U.S. government and taxpayers significant
amounts of money,37 present a high risk to U.S. servicepersons, and
implicate international legal principles38 and foreign policy.
Domestically, hard counterterrorism measures arise in terms of
criminal prosecutions. The U.S. menu of terrorist related crimes,39
coupled with other law enforcement tools, allow prosecutors to bring
charges and try cases against terrorists in U.S. courts. Courts may
impose lengthy sentences on those terrorists upon conviction. When it
comes to criminalizing terrorist recruitment online, however,
criminalization of radical speech or dissemination of distasteful
terrorist aligned materials abuts or overlaps with cherished First
Amendment rights (discussed infra), making the U.S. government
involvement in censorship, regulation of social media, or arrests for
terrorist-aligned speech worrisome.40
C. Soft Approaches to Counterterrorism
Before further discussing the nuances of counterterrorism
strategies on the “softer” end of the spectrum, it would be useful to
35

Id. at 5.
Id. at 6.
37
See NETA C. CRAWFORD, UNITED STATES BUDGETARY COSTS OF THE POST- 9/11 WARS
THROUGH FY2019: $5.9 TRILLION SPENT AND OBLIGATED (Brown U. Watson Inst. Of Int’l and
Pub. Aff., Nov. 14, 2018),
https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/2018/Crawford_Costs%20of%20W
ar%20Estimates%20Through%20FY2019.pdf.
38
For a comprehensive discussion of the international legal landscape and the so-called “War on
Terror,” see e.g., HELEN DUFFY, THE ‘WAR ON TERROR’ AND THE FRAMEWORK OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Cambridge U. Press, 2d ed. 2015).
39
See e.g., 18 U.S.C. §2331 et seq. Notably, the U.S. code lacks a domestic terrorism criminal
statute. For a discussion about a potential domestic terrorism statute, see Mary B. McCord, It’s
Time for Congress to Make Domestic Terrorism a Federal Crime, LAWFARE (Dec. 5, 2018),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/its-time-congress-make-domestic-terrorism-federal-crime.
40
Hardy, supra note 30, at 4-8 (analyzing the United Kingdom’s efforts to criminalize terrorist
behavior facilitated by the Internet and social media, proscribing the act of downloading and/or
printing extremist material, as well as posting statements in online fora encouraging or
supporting terrorism. Clearly, such proscriptions would run afoul of First Amendment
protections of free speech and would thus be unacceptable in United States domestic law
contexts). See e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble . . .”).
36
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define terms. “Anti-radicalization” refers to measures used to prevent
radicalization of individuals before it starts; “counter-radicalization”
refers to stopping the radicalization process once it has begun with a
specified person; and “deradicalization” refers to mitigating or “un”
radicalizing a person who has completed the radicalization process.41
This analysis will use the term “counter-radicalization” to also refer to
the general effort of combating radicalization as a policy consideration.
In a counterterrorism context, “soft” refers to the “attractive
power of a nation’s culture and values”42 in curbing terrorist behavior.
These soft approaches include prison deradicalization programs;
aftercare programs that monitor and remind individuals about the
importance of distancing him/herself from radicalization triggers;
community involvement in anti- and counter-radicalization, as well as
post-institutionalization deradicalization rehabilitation programs;
financial incentives; inter alia.43 Saudi Arabia began its holistic
counterterrorism program in 2005, and in addition to its strong criminal
laws proscribing extremism and terrorism, it employs manifold soft
measures that focus substantially on counter-radicalization and
deradicalization.44 The Saudi initiative does indeed fit the definition of
“deradicalization”: it begins “with the suspected terrorist’s arrest,”
after which the “individual is immediately engaged in dialogue.”45
Participants, should they decide to partake in the “‘religious,
psychological, and cultural’” program,
. . . are allowed to attend social events, including family
gatherings and sports (often games among [participants],
police, and program tutors to foster trust), but are engaged all
the while in a program consolidating the ‘correct notions and
concepts’ of Islam. The program also encourages participants
to marry (with financial support), and to pursue further
education. In returning the [participants] to jobs they held
prior to radicalizing, the program seeks to ground repentant
extremists in a stable environment.46
41
See Lindsey Clutterbuck, Deradicalization Programs and Counterterrorism: A Perspective on
the Challenges and Benefits, MIDDLE EAST INST., (June 10, 2015),
https://www.mei.edu/publications/deradicalization-programs-and-counterterrorism-perspectivechallenges-and-benefits. Notably, Dr. Clutterbuck’s definition of deradicalization specifically
excludes persons who are completely radicalized but do not act on their beliefs. Consequently,
Dr. Clutterbuck’s definition of “deradicalization” only applies those persons caught by the
criminal justice system.
42
Hardy, supra note 30, at 2 (internal quotations omitted).
43
See generally, IPI Report, supra note 14.
44
See id. at 7.
45
Id.
46
Id.
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The program participants may receive healthcare and financial
assistance, not only for themselves but for their families, because
“family loyalty seemed to be stronger than any loyalty to the state, and
so focusing on families seemed to generate longer-lasting results and
fewer regressions to patterns of violence.”47
The Saudi program’s most unique feature, Sakina, focuses
resources combating radicalization in online fora: “[a] carefully
appointed group of intellectuals visit websites where radicals
congregate online and they challenge extreme interpretations of Islam.
They also carry out youth dialogues over the Internet, mirroring the use
of the Internet by violent extremists to recruit prospective terrorists.”48
As noted above, a Sakina-type anti/counter/de-radicalization initiative
would encounter substantial legal friction in the United States. One
reason for this friction being that it requires endorsement by the
government of a “correct” view of Islam, breaching mandates that the
government not interfere in matters of religion under the Establishment
Clause.49
The increase of terrorist presence on social media requires a
response. The question, however, is whether hard or soft measures will
be best suited to the task, considering the particular legal challenges of
regulating social media in the United States. As will be discussed
below, the advantages of AI systems in processing voluminous
amounts of data should be channeled into countering terrorism by using
social media. Before discussing where AI best fits into the U.S.
counterterrorism strategy, it is essential to describe how AI works in
order to understand its strengths and weaknesses.
V.

DISCUSSION OF AI FUNDAMENTALS
A. Defining Artificial Intelligence

At least some AI experts consider AI to be systems “that contain[]
machine learning [] and deep learning [],” and “a combination of
reinforcement learning [] and deep learning . . . .”50 Therefore,
understanding the challenges facing AI in combatting terrorist
47

Id. at 8.
Id. at 8-9.
49
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof,” U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added).
50
Oludare Isaac Abiodun et al., State-of-the-art in artificial neural network applications: A
survey, HELIYON, Nov. 2018, at 8, 10,
https://reader.elsevier.com/reader/sd/pii/S2405844018332067?token=BC6FC8B560036BB840
A960796CEF64F4711376FB7E28B5A2D085BC559B646EBA33DCFAEF3EF636AB8ACE5E
C250891ED0 [hereinafter ANN Survey Article].
48
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recruitment requires a cogent but simplified discussion of how AI
systems interpret data, synthesize it, learn from it, and then act
autonomously.
What makes AI systems useful to humankind? “In some cases,
their value may come from being cheaper, faster, or easier to deploy at
scale relative to human expertise.”51 Some areas in which AI systems
excel, as noted by the Center for a New American Security, include:
data classification; anomaly detection; prediction; and optimization
(like improving energy efficiency), at least in part due to skills like
faster-than-human reaction times; superhuman precision and
reliability; superhuman patience and vigilance; and operations without
connections to humans.52 Thus, AI systems can parse millions of pieces
of data in extremely short amounts of time and make judgments or
decisions classifying or categorizing that data. How AI systems
actually achieve such remarkable results depends on the type of AI
system utilized.53
B. Machine Learning
A popular type of algorithm that guides AI development is known
as a “machine learning” algorithm, and “[t]hese kinds of programs have
been around long enough to run unremarkably in the background of
everyday US life.”54 “Given a goal, learning machines adjust their
behavior to optimize their performance to achieve that goal.”55
Machine learning algorithms are:
processes capable of learning from data to make ever-more
accurate decisions and predictions. Given a set of salient
features to look for (for example, what distinguishes a cat
image from a dog image) and a mass of data on which to train
(a bunch of labeled cat and dog images), a machine-learning
algorithm can come to recognize those features in new data
(like an unlabeled picture of a domestic quadruped) and draw
relevant conclusions (cat or dog).56
51
PAUL SCHARRE ET AL., ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, WHAT EVERY POLICYMAKER NEEDS TO
KNOW 9 (Center for a New American Security, June 19, 2018),
https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/artificial-intelligence-what-every-policymaker-needsto-know.
52
Id. at 9-10.
53
See id. at 3.
54
John Fletcher, Deepfakes, Artificial Intelligence, and Some Kind of Dystopia: The New Faces
of Online Post-Fact Performance, 70 Theatre J. 455, 458 (Dec. 2018), https://muse-jhuedu.proxygt-law.wrlc.org/article/715916/pdf.
55
SCHARRE ET AL., supra note 51, at 5. CNAS produces incredible and important policy
guidance for cutting-edge issues in national security, particularly the realm of AI.
56
Fletcher, supra note 54, at 458 (emphasis in original).
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Some social media platforms already use machine learning to
connect users with “relevant” content:
The algorithms that suggest the next YouTube videos to
watch or that flag spam in your email inbox, for example,
exemplify machine learning. The more input you give those
systems (liking a video, marking a message as spam), the
more accurately they ‘learn’ and successfully predict your
preferences.57
There is also “reinforcement learning,” which “enables a system
or an agent [to] learn from the previous experiences gain[ed] in the
environment through interaction and observing the results of these
interaction . . . [which] helps to mimic or imitate[] the basic pattern in
which humans and animals learn.”58
C. Artificial Neural Networks & Deep Learning
Among the most advanced methods for AI development is the
“artificial neural network” (“ANN”), which “can be comparable [to a]
machine produced to function the same way the human brain performs
a given task of interest.”59 The demonstrable increase in use of ANNs
is a testament to its diverse applicability:
ANNs [have] seen massive use in specific domains, such as[:]
diagnosis of hepatitis; speech recognition; recovery of data in
telecommunications from faulty software; interpretation of
multi-language
messages;
three-dimensional
object
recognition; texture analysis; facial recognition; undersea
mine detection; and hand-written word recognition. Thus,
ANNs can learn by example like people. In some cases,
ANNs can be designed for a specific application like data
classification or pattern recognition through the learning
process.60
People often refer to neural networks in conjunction with another
buzzword, “deep learning,” an advanced type of ANN.61 “Deep
learning” refers to ANNs with complex, hidden layers, meaning the
processes that enable the algorithm to make a conclusion based on an
input are hidden from its human overseers.62 To contrast with simple
57

Id.
ANN Survey Article, supra note 50, at 10.
59
Id. at 4.
60
Id. at 5.
61
See e.g., Bernard Marr, Deep Learning Vs. Neural Networks – What’s the Difference?,
BERNARD MARR & CO., https://bernardmarr.com/default.asp?contentID=1789 (last visited Aug.
24, 2019).
62
Fletcher, supra note 54, at 459.
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machine learning techniques, “[w]hereas machine-learning algorithms
require the features they look for in data to be pre-set, deep-learning
neural net[works] can determine and detect salient features on their
own.”63 Deep learning processes represent a leap forward in AI system
autonomy and development.
In general, AI system designs, at this moment in technological
development, perform well by analyzing vast sets of data and
identifying patterns at light speed after some degree of training.
Therefore, the question arises, how do we best apply AI systems to
achieve U.S. counterterrorism objectives? The next section will
evaluate the best possible ways for the U.S. government and private
sector, respectively, to actualize counterterrorism goals with AI
systems.
III.

GOVERNMENT-BACKED ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGIES

The U.S. government excels at achieving military dominance on
the world stage. While the costs of the “War on Terror”64 reaches
exorbitant levels, the U.S. military campaigns abroad, in many ways,
successfully dismantle terrorist organizations. While the government’s
hard measures accomplish arguably high levels of success, soft
approaches to counterterrorism prove to be difficult to implement.
After a general discussion of legal hurdles to U.S. holistic
counterterrorism strategies, this analysis opines that the government
should withdraw from soft counterterrorism measures and focus on the
approaches on the hard side of the continuum. It is in that context –
military and intelligence – that the government should wield AI.
A. Generally
After the events on September 11th, the U.S. government national
security interest in combating terrorism raced to the forefront of U.S.
policy. It maintained that primacy for years, culminating in the killing
of Osama Bin Laden. However, notwithstanding the evident victory
over Al Qaeda, other terrorism-related threats emerged, including ISIS.
Indeed, the “hard” counterterrorism methods employed by the U.S.
government achieved real results in the “War on Terror,” but they
certainly did not suffice to prevent the spread of radicalization on social
media. As ISIS recruitment proliferated, the U.S. government found
63

Id.
The War on Terror campaign was launched by President George W. Bush in response to the
September 11th attacks in 2001. The purpose of the War on Terror was to eliminate
international extremist and terrorist threats to U.S. interests and the interests of its partners.
64
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itself, constrained by the First Amendment, standing by and
brainstorming ways to act, while ISIS recruited thousands of people.
Since the threat of radicalization infiltrated the Internet, the United
States has grappled with the best method for bringing holistic
counterterrorism measures to the social media space.
B. Challenges
The U.S. government faces two major challenges in creating a
holistic counterterrorism strategy. First, criminalizing speech or
expression on social media treads on First Amendment free speech
protections. Second, effective soft measures, like counterradicalization, will often run afoul of the Establishment Clause under
the First Amendment.
1. First Amendment Concerns
Social media platforms must deal with the antagonism between
regulation of the social media space and the protections of the First
Amendment, which guards against, in relevant part, the abrogation of
speech. The effects of the First Amendment protections on social media
manifest through individuals using social media as a virtual megaphone
for their opinions, thoughts, beliefs, observations, and ideas. The
broadcast of all this information is not limited to U.S. persons; indeed,
literally billions of people around the globe post content on social
media platforms. The sheer volume of such posts collectively by users,
the speed at which the content is released and/or consumed, and the
visibility of the information to all other users on the platforms,
challenges how social media information fits into historical notions of
traditional media. Moreover, the public nature of the social media
platforms allows access to average people and malign actors alike,
including hackers, terrorists, foreign intelligence services, etc.
Although extremist viewpoints tend to fall under the purview of
the First Amendment, the protections are limited. Once speech crosses
into true threats, fraud, child pornography, libel, incitement,
defamation, or imminent threats, the government has the power to
prevent and/or criminalize it.65 So, in considering speech advocating
for violence and terrorism, the “clear and present” danger test66 applies:
65
See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 717 (2012) (striking down the Stolen Valor Act,
as a content-based restriction, violated the First Amendment, where defendant pleaded guilty to
falsely claiming that he had received the Medal of Honor, reasoning that more than just a lie is
required to proscribe untrue speech, because “[t]he remedy for speech that is false is speech that
is true”). Id. at 727.
66
See Schenk v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
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Speech advocating the use of force or crime can only be
proscribed where (1) the speech is ‘directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless action’ – a requirement of intent;
and (2) the advocacy is also ‘likely to produce such action.’
Importantly, when the Court examines the strength of the
government interest proffered today, it ‘unmistakably insists
that any limit on speech be grounded in realistic, factual
assessment of harm.’67
So long as their public posts refrain from imminent threats, ISIS
sympathizers musing about the downfall of the United States may
abstractly hide behind the aegis of the First Amendment.68
Notably, it is unlikely that the umbra of protection afforded by the
First Amendment extends to non-U.S. persons living abroad:
interpreting what “the people of the United States” means for several
rights in the Constitution, the Supreme Court stated in dicta that
“[w]hile this textual exegesis is by no means conclusive, it suggests
that ‘the people’ protected by the Fourth Amendment, and by the First
and Second Amendments . . . refers to a class of persons who are part
of a national community or who have otherwise developed sufficient
connection with this country to be considered part of that
community.”69 The lack of extraterritorial attachment of First
Amendment rights may give flexibility to the government when
operating abroad, especially if it targets non-U.S. persons’ use of social
media accounts abroad.
Should the government attempt to criminalize abstract, nonimminent violent or extreme speech as a hard counterterrorism
measure? The courts would likely strike such legislation down. In that
sense, the government faces a challenge virtually unique to the United
67
Tompros et al., The Constitutionality of Criminalizing False Speech Made on Social
Networking Sites in a Post-Alvarez, Social Media-Obsessed World, 31 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 64, 93
(2017) (citing Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969); United States v. Williams, 553
U.S. 285, 321-22 (2008) (Souter, J., dissenting)).
68
See Elonis v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2001 (2015) (overturning defendant’s conviction for
making threats over interstate commerce, holding that, where defendant made numerous violent
posts about his ex-wife on Facebook, the jury instruction given by the Court, using the
reasonable person standard, was “inconsistent with the conventional requirement for criminal
conduct – awareness of some wrongdoing,” but not considering defendant’s first amendment
claims (internal quotations omitted)). Id. at 2003.
69
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990) (rejecting defendant’s
argument that Fourth Amendment protections applied to him, a foreign national, holding “the
Fourth Amendment has no application,” reasoning that “[a]t the time of the search, he was a
citizen and resident of Mexico with no voluntary attachment to the United States, and the place
searched was located in Mexico”). Id.at 274-75. See also United States ex rel. Turner v.
Williams, 194 U.S. 279, 292 (1904) (finding that an excludable alien does not enjoy First
Amendment rights, reasoning that “[h]e does not become one of the people to whom these
things are secured by our Constitution by an attempt to enter forbidden by law.”).
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States. Other nations that are aligned philosophically in many ways
with the United States (like the United Kingdom) have no limitations
proscribing extremist speech as a part of their counterterrorism
approach, and those prohibitions do not run afoul of their keystone
legal principles.70
2. Establishment Clause Concerns
The Supreme Court “has been inconsistent about the tests used to
analyze the Establishment Clause,” and therefore the jurisprudence is
not simple.71 The Lemon test uses three prongs to evaluate whether
government activity violates the Establishment clause, failure to satisfy
any one of the prongs results in a violation72:
the original test included (1) whether the government policy
has a legitimate secular purpose; (2) whether the policy’s
primary effect is one of advancing or inhibiting religion; and
(3) whether the policy creates excessive government
entanglement with religion.73
Crucially, most questions arising under the Establishment Clause
deal with endorsement of a particular religion rather than express
disapproval of religious beliefs.74 Most obviously, any attempt by the
government to proscribe specific forms or sects of Islam, for example,
would violate the Establishment Clause.75
Likewise, when it comes to soft approaches like counterradicalization, the government likewise confronts difficulties.
“[C]ounter-radicalization puts the government in the position, vis-à-vis
Islam, of serving as a kind of official theologian, taking positions on
the meaning of inevitably contested religious concepts and weighing in
on one side of debates that rage within a particular faith tradition.”76 In
other words, the Establishment Clause prohibits the government from
endorsing one religious perspective. So, if the government extols a
“mainstream” version of Islam or works to persuade a person online
70

See Hardy, supra note 30, at 4-8.
Allison Hugi, A Borderline Case: The Establishment Clause Implications of Religious
Questioning by Government Officials, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 193, 197 (Jan. 2018).
72
Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 583 (1987).
73
Hugi, supra note 71, at 198-99 (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971)).
74
See Everson v. Board of Education of Ewing TP et al., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
75
See e.g., Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1131 (10th Cir. 2012) (striking down a proposed
Oklahoma state constitutional amendment banning Sharia law in Court, applying the different
Larson strict scrutiny test, reasoning that “[e]ven if the state could identify and support a reason
to single out and restrict Sharia law in its courts, the amendment’s complete ban of Sharia law is
hardly an exercise of narrow tailoring.”).
76
Samuel J. Rascoff, Establishing Official Islam? The Law and Strategy of CounterRadicalization, 64 STAN. L. REV. 125, 162 (2012).
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that radical Islamic viewpoints fail to really understand the Koran, the
government official crosses the boundary into constitutionally
restricted government endorsements of religion.77
From a policy perspective as opposed to a legal one, government
led counter-radicalization measures, specifically those aimed at
Muslims, may isolate Muslims in those communities by treating them
differently than other Muslims, and differently than the non-Muslim
population. The Saudi Sakina program, discussed above, did not
struggle in the same fashion for several reasons. One reason being that
Saudi Arabia is a Muslim nation where religion, law, and government
exist inextricably. In addition to these legal hurdles, from a more
practical perspective, people do not consider the U.S. government to
be a credible messenger in general.78
Considering the legal challenges, if the U.S. government
programmed an AI system to, for example, search social media
platforms for extremist groups or discussions and then generate
automated responses arguing a moderate interpretation of Islam, then
this would likely be unconstitutional and would also be a misplacement
of resources. Therefore, the government should use AI in a space in
which it dominates and excels.
C. Current Approaches and Strategies
AI systems, deployed in a thoughtful way for the government
counterterrorism strategy, have the potential to augment the national
security effort, particularly abroad in support of “hard” measures. The
U.S. military already uses automated weapon technology to bolster its
capabilities, but automated weapons are outside this discussion.79 The
U.S. government should (if it does not already) deploy AI systems to
provide support to military kinetic and non-kinetic objectives
including, but not limited to, locating terrorists, strategizing and
prioritizing target individuals in a network, and studying and predicting
terrorist movements.
As discussed above, for AI to reach its peak efficacy, it requires
vast quantities of data. If a machine learning or deep neural network AI
system could access data on terrorist behavior to sift through data and
develop patterns, locations, phone numbers, etc., the results could be
77

For deep analyses of Establishment Clause doctrine and counter-radicalization, see generally
Rascoff, supra note 76.
78
See e.g., BIPARTISAN POLICY CENTER, DIGITAL COUNTERTERRORISM, FIGHTING JIHADISTS
ONLINE (Mar. 2018). The U.S. government’s counter-messaging program actually caused the
attitudes regarding the U.S. government of foreign Arab students to degrade.
79
For a full discussion of automated weapons systems, see PAUL SCHARRE, ARMY OF NONE:
AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS AND THE FUTURE OF WAR (W.W. Norton & Co., 2018).
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invaluable to the intelligence community and military. Indeed, the
National Center for Counterterrorism [“NCTC”] housed in the Office
of the Director of National Intelligence [“ODNI”] has a vast repository
of data on terrorist networks. In 2011, ODNI contained over half a
million names of terrorists.80 One of its primary mission areas is
“identity management,” which it defines as the “responsibility to serve
as the central and shared knowledge bank on known and suspected
terrorist and international terror groups, as well as their goals,
strategies, capabilities, and networks of contacts and support.”81 The
NCTC gleans this information from a wide variety of sources including
classified human intelligence sources, signal intelligence, and open
sources like social media.82 Data about a terrorist network may paint a
picture of the connections between terrorists, highlighting the central
individuals and showing which persons exist on the fringes of the
network.83 Clearly “. . . data can be . . . analyzed to support the
development of either kinetic or non-kinetic strategies to counter
terrorism.”84 AI systems could optimize the synthesizing of
intelligence, or even predict future terrorist behavior based on the
patterns in the data.
Hypothetically, as a counterterrorism prevention and prosecution
strategy, a government-controlled AI system could scour social media
posts seeking those posts that follow a particular formula: language of
threats of violence, declarations of imminence, coupled with some
extremist ideological language. If the programmed parameters of the
AI system’s alerts conform to constitutional principles, this method
could benefit law enforcement and prosecutors. However, if law
enforcement arrests and prosecutes a person based on evidence
gathered using this kind of AI monitoring method, without other
evidence, it seems likely that the defendant would challenge the
assumptions and parameters used by the AI system, meaning that the
AI system would then likely have to be explainable. In other words, the
results or conclusions generated by the AI system explained in this way
may be able to be understood or justified, not rendered opaque by
complex code or by an internal mechanism used to intentionally hide a
80

Roberts & Everton, supra note 32, at 2.
NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM CTR., TODAY’S NCTC 6, (Aug. 2017),
https://www.dni.gov/files/NCTC/documents/features_documents/NCTC-Primer_FINAL.pdf.
82
“Social media scraping tools” are commercially available and are typically used to “extract
data from channels which not only include social networking sites, such as Facebook, Twitter,
Instagram, LinkedIn…etc., but also include blogs, wikis, and news sites.” Top 5 Social Media
Scraping Tools for 2019, OCTOPARSE (Oct. 17, 2018), https://www.octoparse.com/blog/top-5social-media-scraping-tools-for-2018.
83
See generally, Roberts & Everton, supra note 32.
84
Id. at 9.
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proprietary algorithm.85 In the context of criminal prosecutions, the
importance of understanding the programming and rules in an AI
system builds trust in that AI system. If a scientist or programmer
cannot evaluate the inner workings of an AI system’s algorithm, how
can people trust that it is acting in accordance with its programming?
By way of example, what if the programmer built a system that
purposely targets Muslims only? That kind of unconscionable
programming would violate cherished constitutional rights,
discriminating against a specific sect of American society.
Consequently, this approach would pose substantial prosecutorial risk,
as well as undermine bedrock American principles. Indeed, if the
government used some kind of algorithmic terrorist risk assessment as
a part of sentencing, or to propose potential deradicalization methods
for that defendant, such a proposal could potentially violate the
defendant’s constitutional due process rights.86 Thus, using AI in the
realm of criminal prosecutions seems like a misapplication of the
technology – it would be better suited in other contexts.
The U.S. government is limited in how it can tackle the holistic
approach to counterterrorism that employs both hard and soft
measures. However, the U.S. intelligence community and military
already have resources that could benefit from AI optimization.
However, much in the same way that the NCTC “crawls” or “scrapes”
the Internet by collecting open source information, the U.S.
government should use an AI system to “scrape” the social media
accounts of foreign terrorists. This use of AI Internet scraping would
not only be used for intelligence gathering and non-kinetic measures,
but for offensive, cyber-enabled hard measures. The proposal section
below will explore some forward-thinking, possibly provocative
approaches to AI system deployment, beyond these obvious options
already available and likely used in hard counterterrorism approaches.
VI.

SOCIAL MEDIA-CREATED ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND
SOFT COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGIES

The power and ubiquity of social media platforms like Facebook,
Twitter, Instagram, LinkedIn, YouTube, among others,87 increased
85
KYNDI, HOW ‘EXPLAINABILITY’ IS DRIVING THE FUTURE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 2
(2018) https://kyndi.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Kyndi-final-Explainable-AI-WhitePaper.pdf.
86
For a wonderful discussion of the difficulty implementing unexplainable “black box”
algorithms in the criminal justice system, see Leah Wisser, Pandora’s Algorithmic Black Box:
The Challenges of Using Algorithmic Risk Assessments in Sentencing, 56 AM. CRIM L. REV.
1811 (2019).
87
Although Google is more of a search engine than a “social media” platform, this discussion
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exponentially since they took hold in the early to mid-aughts. They
spread like wildfire across the globe and reached billions of people.
They provide a modality for free expression: individuals create content,
share information, communicate with friends, and even make
purchases, transfer money, and sell goods or services. As discussed
above, the broad reach of social media, and its unique capacity to bring
people together creates a place for positive discussion as well as a
forum for malefactors to conspire, plan, and recruit for malignant
purposes. The uniquely broad reach of these private-sector platforms,
in conjunction with special legal status, makes them ideal methods for
furthering softer counterterrorism measures.
A. Challenges
Social media platforms walk a fine line between two conflicting
goals: the primary goal being to promote a free environment for
expression and the subordinate goal being to police objectionable
content. Many questions arise about how social media platforms could
possibly achieve their goals. The following sections will highlight
common challenges to social media platforms’ efforts in
counterterrorism.
1. § 230 of the Communications Decency Act
[“CDA”]
In the nineties, in response to absurd impositions of liability on
Internet Service Providers [“ISPs”] based on common law principles,
Congress passed the CDA in 1996, but the American Civil Liberties
Union challenged the law shortly thereafter, resulting only in one
provision remaining intact: § 230.88 Congress plainly expressed its
policy in enacting the CDA, specifically § 230: “(1) to promote the
continued development of the internet and other interactive computer
services and other interactive media; (2) to preserve the vibrant and
competitive free market that presently exists for the internet and other
interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State
regulation. . . .”89 To achieve its legislative purpose, Congress
implemented broad protections for “interactive computer services”90:
“[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be
captures Google’s universal reach into everyday life as well.
88
Phe, supra note 7, at 108. See also id., supra note 7, at 103-110 (explaining the impetus for
the CDA’s implementation and a general historical survey of the CDA).
89
47 U.S.C. §§ 230(b)(1) - (b)(2).
90
Phe, supra note 7, at 110. (“Immunity under § 230 extends only to interactive computer
services providers and not to information content providers.”).
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treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by
another information content provider,” and they will enjoy immunity
from civil liability for “any action voluntarily taken in good faith to
restrict access to or availability of material to restrict access to or
availability of material that the provider or user considers to be
obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or
otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is
constitutionally protected. . . .”91 The language of the statute
distinguishes between such platform intermediaries and “information
content providers,” which are “entit[ies] that [are] responsible, in
whole or in part for the creation or development of information
provided through the Internet or any other interactive computer
service.”92 In other words, “information content providers” actually
create content and post that content on the Internet, as opposed to acting
as a medium or virtual bulletin board for others’ content.
The statute’s broad grant of immunity from liability under § 230
evolved to apply to social media platforms.93 The immunity continues
to allow a protective shroud around those social media platforms which
allow users to post content. Congress granted broad immunity to foster
free-speech, free-market, and exchange of ideas over two decades ago.
However, when implementing § 230 during the Internet’s infancy,
Congress could not predict how it would connect billions of people on
an individual level. It used to be the major method of connectivity for
a few million users, but it has become a foundational, yet subordinate
protocol upon which the behemoth social media platforms with billions
of users built themselves – platforms like Facebook, Twitter, Google,
and YouTube.94 The effect of § 230 immunity is that social media
cannot be held responsible for extremist content and terrorist activity.95

91

47 U.S.C. §§ 230(c)(1)-(2)(A)
47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3).
93
The three-pronged test used by courts to determine whether an entity should receive §230
immunity: “whether an interactive computer service is used or provided; whether the entity can
be considered an information content provider of the objectionable content or activity in
question; and whether the cause of action seeks to hold the entity as a publisher or speaker of
third-party content.” Phe, supra note 7, at 110.
94
Phe notes that it is indeed “questionable whether social media websites even qualify for
immunity under §230” because “[s]ocial media websites certainly take a more active role in
selecting the kinds of information disseminated on their platforms compared to traditional
publishers,” although courts seem to uniformly apply §230 to social media platforms. Id. at 127.
95
See e.g., Gonzalez v. Google Inc., 282 F.Supp.3d 1150 (N.D. Cal 2017).
92
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2. “Engagement”
Algorithms

Problems

in

Social

Media

Social media platforms employ illustrious algorithms and AI
systems to optimize searches and offer advertisements to third parties
about platform users. Indeed, the issue of “engagement,” that is,
algorithms calibrated to “maximize long-term viewer engagement and
satisfaction,”96 brings about some ironic perversions. The algorithm
evidently presents extreme search results related to whatever a person
searches for, as opined by former counsel for National Security Agency
[“NSA”] and Department of Homeland Security [“DHS”], Stewart
Baker:
[t]he drive to extremes that recommendation engines send you
down is very, very real because there’s something – and it
could be it drives you towards extremes of weightlifting; it
drives you towards extremes of home knitting; or it drives you
toward extremes of sexual perversion. And part of this is just
it’s human nature, right? They’re telling you what other
people who looked at this video went on to look at, and those
people went on to look at . . . other extreme things precisely
because that was their nature.97
The search terms are inputs for the algorithms, and to keep
viewers engaged, its design results in outputs of extreme content
related to that original term. The user then accesses the content, and by
accessing the content, the user inputs his/her new views of the extreme
content into the algorithm, creating a self-radicalizing feedback loop.98
The question then becomes, should social media platforms try to
counteract or revamp these engagement models? Baker notes the
quandary:
There is a reinforcing effect. So, I see the problem, I’m not
sure the answer is stop doing recommendations because there
is an awful lot of value in those recommendations … so
figuring out when you should stop or moderate your
recommendation engines, strikes me, maybe because I am a
minority in this regard, at least in Silicon Valley – they would
cheerfully take three quarters of my views and say “we’ll
never recommend anyone who looks at those” – and so the
idea that they should be saying people with views like yours
96
Paige Cooper, How Does the YouTube Algorithm Work? A Guide to Getting More Views,
HOOTSUITE (Apr. 8, 2019), https://blog.hootsuite.com/how-the-youtube-algorithm-works/.
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Stewart Baker, In the cyber adversary Olympics, it’s Russia for the gold and North Korea (!)
for the silver, THE CYBERLAW PODCAST (Feb. 27, 2019), https://www.steptoe.com/feedCyberlaw.rss.
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should not be able to find each other online is troubling.99
Along the same vein, a recent article published by the New York
Times documents the role played by engagement-oriented algorithms
in the radicalization of a young man named Caleb Cain, who found
himself in the world of far-right extremism, saying “[w]hen I found this
stuff, I felt like I was chasing uncomfortable truths . . . I felt like it was
giving me power and respect and authority.”100 Clearly, social media
platforms with such engagement models built into their algorithms
must weigh the great benefit of those models against the risk of
radicalization, which many platforms recently pledged to actively
combat. The solution to the problem is certainly not easy to discern.
3. How to Hold Social Media Platforms Accountable
There is no comfortable means of regulating social media
platforms, but U.S. policy makers must start finding creative solutions.
Some commentators suggest legislation proposing that § 230 “should
be revised to categorically withhold immunity from ISPs that have
actual knowledge their websites are used to conduct terrorist
operations, as well as ISPs that choose to profit off their platforms
despite reasonable notice or knowledge that they are hosting content
from a terrorist or terrorist organization.”101 Social media platforms
should be incentivized to implement baseline self-policing measures
for extremist content, or alternatively, disincentivized to allow
extremist content. While many platforms declared their commitment to
countering extremist behavior, they need something beyond the current
framework to make meaningful progress in opposing terrorist activities
on their networks.
B. Current Approaches and Strategies for Social Media Use of
AI in Counterterrorism
Notwithstanding the general criticism of social media platform
efforts to combat terrorist activities, some platforms began
implementing AI systems in their self-policing counterterrorism
efforts. Facebook’s founder and CEO, Mark Zuckerberg, while
testifying before Congress, noted several ways that Facebook uses AI
to combat objectionable actors on the platform. In the context of
foreign disinformation and election meddling, he said that “the AI tools
that we deployed in those elections were able to proactively take down
99
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tens of thousands of fake accounts that may have been trying to
[influence those elections].”102 Beyond election meddling, Facebook
targets extremists who virtually gather on its platform: “if there is a
group that their primary purpose or a large part of what they do is
spreading hate, we will ban them from the platform,” and Facebook
works to “adjust [its] algorithms to prevent those interested in violence
or bad activities from being connected with other like-minded
individuals[.]”103 Facebook’s approach certainly interposes barriers for
extremists, but that strategy should be but one facet in the holistic,
multi-dimensional approach to counterterrorism.
One of the most creative uses of AI systems in counterterrorism
is the Jigsaw Redirect Method:
Jigsaw, the Google-owned tech incubator and think tank . . .
has been working . . . to develop a new program it hopes can
use a combination of Google’s search algorithms and
YouTube’s video platform to target aspiring ISIS recruits and
ultimately dissuade them from joining the group’s cult of
apocalyptic violence. The program, which Jigsaw calls the
Redirect Method . . . places advertising alongside results for
any keywords and phrases that Jigsaw had determined people
attracted to ISIS commonly searched for. 104
The Redirect Method identifies specific extremist narratives,
finding the content in English and Arabic, and when a person searches
for such extremist content, the algorithm uses microtargeting in curated
playlists to offer them counter-radicalization content where online ads
might be.105 The project boasts quality results: the project reached
320,906 users, and “redirected” users watched a total of 500,070
minutes of video during its pilot.106
CONCLUSIONS & PROPOSALS
The U.S. government and the private sector social media
platforms each have roles to play in counterterrorism, but their roles
diverge significantly. As the above analysis demonstrates, the
government excels at “hard” counterterrorism strategies. It uses
102
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military force, information operations, and psychological operations
abroad to combat global terrorism, but also investigates, arrests, and
prosecutes suspected terrorists domestically. But, constitutional, legal,
and practical issues impede the government’s ability to effectively
utilize “soft” counterterrorism strategies like counter-messaging and
counter-radicalization.
Conversely, social media platforms lack the legal authority or
the business incentives to use hard counterterrorism measures because
such tools fall squarely in the domain of the government. However, the
social media platforms’ incentive to self-police (for instance, in order
to avoid passage of legislation that could increase potential liability),
lack of constitutional constraints, and access to technology make them
well suited to pursue softer counterterrorism strategies.
Consequently, a counterterrorism partnership between the
government and social media platforms would provide a
comprehensive approach to counterterrorism that marries hard
measures executed by the government, with soft strategies
implemented by social media platforms.
With these conclusions in mind, this analysis will propose
useful ways the government and social media platforms can deploy AI
systems to augment their respective strengths to combat terrorist
behavior.
1.

The United States Government Should Deploy AI Systems to
Coordinate Offensive Cyber-Capabilities Against Foreign
Terrorist Recruiters on Social Media

The U.S. military has express authority from Congress in the John
S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019
[“NDAA FY2019”] to use cyber-capabilities to battle cyber-threats:
“[i]t shall be the policy of the United States, with respect to matters
pertaining to cyberspace, cybersecurity, and cyber warfare, that the
United States should employ all instruments of national power,
including the use of offensive cyber capabilities, to deter if possible,
and to respond when necessary, all cyber[-]attacks or other malicious
cyber activities of foreign powers that target United States interests . .
. .”107 The term “foreign powers” includes groups “engaged in
international terrorism or activities in preparation therefor,”108 and ISIS
107
National Defense Authorization Act Fiscal Year 2019, H.R. 5515, 115th Cong., Title XVI §
1636(a) (2018).
108
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act [“FISA”], 50 U.S.C. § 1801(a)(4) (2012). The NDAA
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recruitment or encouragement on social media likely counts as
“preparation” for international terrorism if done by a non-U.S. person.
While the U.S. government would be limited in using its capabilities
against U.S. persons abroad,109 such limitations do not apply to nonU.S. persons abroad. Although, at least for surveillance of non-U.S.
persons, the law requires minimization procedures be implemented to
prevent accidental or incidental surveillance of U.S. persons.110
Moreover, U.S. constitutional rights do not apply to non-U.S. persons
located abroad, as held by the Supreme Court in Verdugo-Urquidez.111
The advantages of machine learning AI systems could be directly
implemented in an aggressive, cyber-enabled information operation on
social media platforms. An AI controlled by the U.S. government could
be trained to crawl social media platforms like Facebook or YouTube
using a false identity “cover account,” designed to appear like a person
susceptible to recruitment. The AI system would be trained on terrorist
recruitment data (e.g., name, location, interests, language in posts,
etc.), which would allow it to generate an output with all the
characteristics exemplary of a person sought for recruitment by a
terrorist organization like ISIS. The AI system would be able to create
many of these false identity accounts.
The AI would be programmed to generate apparently extremist
content by crawling extremist sites or archived extremist data, training
on language used by extremists.112 The AI system could then peruse or
periodically post extremist-leaning comments on extremist pages,
indicative of a person who appears ready to be radicalized, with the
goal of luring a terrorist recruiter into making contact. Once the
recruiter makes contact, the AI system would engage in dialogue with
the recruiter, until the AI system decides it has an opportunity to strike.
The AI system would then offer a hyperlink to the recruiter and the
hyperlink would purport to activate a video chat (like Skype),
encrypted messenger (like telegram), or show an extremist website or
picture. That link, however, would be a vehicle for a “Network
Investigative Technique[] [“NIT”] . . . which include computer code
that investigators can send covertly to a device,” which “can send law
enforcement particular information, often including the device’s true
109
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IP address – which investigators can use to identify the subscriber and
user of the device.”113 More sophisticated malware can allow the
operators to infiltrate the system without the operator’s knowledge.
Being able to access a terrorist recruiter’s computer would potentially
offer troves of intelligence, could shut down a recruiter’s computer or
operation, and/or infiltrate the recruiter’s phone or computer and copy
his/her information.114 The ability of AI systems to synthesize vast
amounts of data about terrorist recruiters, generate responses in social
media, while coordinating between accounts, would give an AI system
an edge over the numerous human operators it would take to
orchestrate such a campaign.
The above proposed cyber-campaign against terrorist recruiters
assumes that the targets are non-U.S. persons because U.S. persons are
entitled to the panoply of rights guaranteed under the Constitution,
even when located abroad. How can U.S. government cyber-operators
be sure that a person is not a U.S. person? AI systems can potentially
solve that problem with their incredible data processing abilities. An
AI system can likely scrape location data from accounts in the same
way that advertisers obtain such data. If properly programmed to ignore
people linked to the United States, the AI system can avoid catching
U.S. persons in its operational net. Moreover, any statutory
minimization procedures required could presumably be programmed
into the AI systems engaged in cyber-operations.
AI systems may be the perfect tool for hard counterterrorism
measures on social media. If the government tailored AI systems to act
like susceptible potential recruits, they could coordinate automated,
well-orchestrated cyber-campaigns to dismantle terrorist recruitment
networks abroad, while devoting less human capital, and not violating
upon other States’ sovereignty.
2.

Social Media Platforms Should Use AI Systems to Inundate
Extremist Fora with Counter-Messaging

Social media platforms should embrace their exclusion from
constitutional requirements to push harder against terrorist recruitment
on their sites, a problem for which AI offers a solution.
As discussed supra, the Saudi government’s anti-/counterradicalization program Sakina aims to have Muslim scholars enter
113
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extremist social media fora to challenge radical views and engage in
dialogue for the purpose of dissuading young people susceptible to
radicalization in seeking answers in those fora. The Saudi Government
Sakina program boasted a relatively high success rate.
Social media platforms, using machine learning AI systems, could
train AI systems on fundamental principles of Islam taken from nonextremist viewpoints and essentially implement a worldwide “AI
based-Sakina” program that would use AI-created accounts to debate
extremists in extremist fora. AI systems could generate account
handles, and after training on vast amounts of data, could engage
extremists or individuals in the midst of radicalization, while
challenging the extremist narratives with difficult philosophical
questions modeled on extent community beliefs or factual statements
about the extremist movement’s assumptions. AI-powered “chatbots”
have been tested in clinical psychological settings and in some cases,
successfully used to replace one-on-one therapy sessions.115 The
perspectives offered could draw from wide ranging viewpoints, so long
as they exclude the radical ones. In addition, this strategy could be used
in the context of ISIS-type extremist to domestic white nationalist
recruitment. In an ISIS context, challenging the “utopia” narrative
might dispel the notion that the ISIS caliphate is a paradise with
beautiful land, peace, and jobs. The AI system could, in a manner akin
to the Redirect Method, offer access to relevant content like pictures,
articles, and videos that challenge those ideas. This strategy, if
employed by the government, would implicate the Establishment
Clause, but social media platforms, as private actors, do not confront
such constitutional barriers.
The Redirect Method is the most creative soft approach employed
by social media, but it tackles the issue in a passive fashion. In a realm
where the U.S. government cannot tread easily, a Sakina style program
deployed by social media platforms would allow aggressive infiltration
of extremist fora, and affirmatively and offensively present counterradicalization material to people it deems to be on the verge of
recruitment.
To achieve a holistic approach to terrorism that implements both
hard and soft measures, the U.S. government and the social media
platforms must attack the problem using their strengths, and that
requires a concomitant and coordinated effort involving the use of AI.
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